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TOWARD A SOUTH AFRICAN ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE ACT
Michael Asimow*
Section 33 of South Africa's Constitution provides fundamental
principles of administrative justice. It also requires Parliament to adopt
an Administrative Justice Act. This Article contends that without
enactment of such legislation Section 33 will be ineffective in practice
and may prove to be an obstacle to achieving the economic and social
objectives of the Constitution. In addition, such legislation is essential to
preserving the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the Constitutional
Court.
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INTRODUCTION
The Bill of Rights in South Africa's new Constitution contains
administrative justice provisions that break sharply with preconsti-
tutional law. Section 33 promises administrative action that is
lawful, reasonable, procedurally fair, and accompanied by a written
statement of reasons.' These are lofty aspirations, but they will not
easily be achieved in practice. This Article, written from an out-
sider's perspective, examines some of the obstacles strewn on the
path of implementation of section 33. It urges that Parliament enact
an administrative justice act as a matter of priority,2 as section 33(3)
obligates it to do.
3
Administrative law is certain to play an essential role in South
Africa's immediate future.4 Only positive government action can
bring economic development, housing, infrastructure, better
education and health care, and numerous other services to the vast
majority of the population who were victimized by apartheid laws
and who subsist at Third World levels. The government must
engage in redistributive programs, such as land restitution and
affirmative action,5 and enforce laws that prohibit wrongful
discrimination.
All this can be achieved only through executive-branch
administrative bodies empowered by statute. Such bodies must act
1. Section 33 provides:
(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, rea-
sonable, and procedurally fair.
(2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administra-
tive action has the right to be given written reasons.
(3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights,
and must-
(a) provide for the review of administrative action by a court or,
where appropriate, an independent and impartial tribunal;
(b) impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in sub-
sections (1) and (2); and
(c) promote an efficient administration.
S. AFR. CONST. § 33.
2. Cf Hugh Corder, Administrative Justice in the Final Constitution, 13 S. AFR. J. ON
HUM. RMs. 28, 41-43 (1997) (asserting that an Administrative Justice Act is an
important, if secondary, "means of achieving democratic practices" and suggesting
five essential features that should be incorporated into such an Act).
3. S. AFR. CONST. § 33; see supra text accompanying note 1.
4. Dennis M. Davis, Administrative Justice in a Democratic South Africa, in
CONTROLLING PUBLIC POWER: ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE THROUGH THE LAW 19-27
(Hugh Corder & Fiona McLennan eds., 1995) [hereinafter CONTROLLING PUBLIC
POWER].
5. See Stephen Ellmann, The New South African Constitution and Ethnic Division, 26
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 5,34-40 (1994).
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in accordance with common law and constitutional principles of
administrative law. Courts or tribunals must provide appropriate
forms of review. Administrative procedure and review must be, and
must appear to be, democratic in character, fully accountable, user-
friendly, responsive, participatory, and transparent. 6 Yet the
administrative process must also satisfy traditional evaluative
criteria: it must produce accurate results within a reasonable time
and at reasonable cost to both the public sector and to private
parties.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE
Section 33 of the final Constitution,7 which is entitled "Just
administrative action," articulates basic rights to administrative
justice. However, these rights are not self-executing; they must be
implemented by legislation. In contrast, section 24 of the interim
Constitution provided for a similar set of rights that were self-
executing8 but were subject to limitation by legislation or judicial
decision under the general limitations clause. 9
An unusual transitional provision contained in the final Con-
stitution leaves the administrative justice provisions of the interim
Constitution in effect until the legislation envisaged in section 33(3)
is adopted. If such legislation is not enacted within three years of the
6. Etienne Mureinik, Reconsidering Review: Participation and Accountability, in
CONTROLLING PUBLIC POWER, supra note 4, at 28, 35 ("Whether we attain democracy
will consequently depend upon administrative law: upon the legal forces which
pull-or fail to pull- government decision-making towards democratic decision-
making.").
7. S. AFR. CONST. § 33; see also supra text accompanying note 1.
8. Section 24 of the interim Constitution provides:
Every person shall have the right to -
(a) lawful administrative action where any of his or her rights
or interests is affected or threatened;
(b) procedurally fair administrative action where any of his or
her rights or legitimate expectations is affected or threatened;
(c) be furnished with reasons in writing for administrative
action which affects any of his or her rights or interests unless
the reasons for such action have been made public; and
(d) administrative action which is justifiable in relation to the
reasons given for it where any of his her rights is affected or
threatened.
S. AFR. CONST. of 1994 § 24.
9. The general limitations clause in section 33 of the interim Constitution allows
the rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights to be limited by law of general application,
provided that such limitations are reasonable, justifiable in an open and democratic
society based on freedom and equality, and do not negate the essential content of the
right in question. Id. § 33.
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date the new Constitution takes effect, the administrative justice
provisions of sections 33(1) and (2) apparently become free-standing
and section 33(3) falls away10
Thus the Constitution mandates the enactment of administrative
procedure legislation. In addition, it furnishes a powerful incentive
for Parliament to enact such legislation within the three-year period.
The incentive exists because, as this Article will discuss, sections
33(1) and (2) are quite far reaching and therefore clearly require
limitation. In addition, section 33(3)(c) explicitly permits Parliament
to take account of efficiency considerations, whereas it is unclear
whether Parliament has the same latitude under the Constitution's
general limitation clause." Yet the process of enacting such
legislation will be lengthy and arduous; numerous painful
compromises must be negotiated.' 2
One school of thought holds that it would be better if no
administrative justice legislation were adopted. In that case, the
section 33 administrative justice rights would apparently become
free standing, subject only to legislative or judicial limitation under
the general limitations provision.' 3 This Article argues that such an
outcome would be unfortunate.
10. S. AFR. CONST. Sched. 6, §23(2); see also Certification of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (4) SALR 744, 802-03 (CC). This portion of the Court's
certification decision concerned the freedom of information provisions of the interim
and final Constitutions and a transitional provision which is very similar to the one
governing administrative justice. The Court held that the suspended portion of the
freedom of information provision, section 32(1), would become free-standing in the
event that implementing national legislation was not enacted within three years.
The relationship between the interim and final Constitutions and the transi-
tional provision has given rise to a number of interpretations in addition to the one
put forward in the text. Some South African scholars read the transitional provision
to mean that if no national legislation is adopted, the provisions of section 24 of the
interim Constitution remain in effect indefinitely. Others interpret the provisions to
mean that the courts should immediately apply sections 33(1) and (2), with national
legislation simply making the practical implementation of the rights in these sections
more effective. See Corder, supra note 2, at 41-43. Still others read the transitional
provision to mean that the administrative justice provisions of both the interim and
final constitutions fall away if no legislation is enacted.
11. See infra note 84.
12. Prominent South African lawyers have labored for years to craft and enact an
Open Democracy Bill incorporating freedom of information, open meetings, and
whistleblower protection. These efforts made slow progress, although there is now
some prospect that legislation may finally be enacted.
13. The general limitation provision of section 36(1) provides:
[t]he rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of
general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity,
equality, and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors includ-
ing-
(a) the nature of the right;
[VOL. 3:1
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II. UNCERTAINTY AND OVERBREADTH IN SECTION 33
I believe that section 33 should not be allowed to go into effect
without limitation by national legislation.
A. The Section 33 Rights Are Uncertain and Overbroad
The rights to administrative justice entrenched in section 33 are
precious and vital to democratic government. Nevertheless, their
uncertainty and overbreadth present serious practical problems.
First, the section 33 rights will have little impact until they have
been construed in a wide variety of contexts and actually applied in
practice. So far as I can determine, there has been little change in
administrative practice since the interim Constitution went into ef-
fect in April 1994.14 Government at all levels is preoccupied with the
problems of managing a transition to multiracial democracy and in-
vesting in infrastructure and economic development-not worrying
about procedural niceties. The right to administrative justice will
make little difference to ordinary people until it is implemented by
detailed legislation backed up by detailed procedural regulations
that tell every unit of government exactly what must be done to take
administrative action.
Second, South Africa must devote enormous resources to over-
coming the effects of apartheid and neglect on the vast majority of
its population. By any analysis the available resources fall far short
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and
(e) the less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
S. AFR. CONST. § 36(1).
It can be argued that Parliament would have less power to limit the adminis-
trative justice rights under section 36(1) than under section 33(3) because of the
explicit reference to efficiency in section 33(3)(c). See infra note 84.
14. See, e.g., GERRIT VAN DER WALDT & RITA HELMBOLD, THE CONSTITUTION AND A
NEW PUBuC ADMINISTRATION (1995). This work, which discusses public administra-
tion and the new Constitution, barely mentions administrative justice and does not
even suggest that the administrative justice provisions of the interim Constitution
might affect the practices of public administrators. See also Maharaj v. Chairman,
Liquor Bd., 1997 (1) SALR 273 (NPD) (exemplifying the sort of shoddy local admin-
istrative practice that must be quite prevalent).
In general, little seems to be known about how South African bureaucracies
actually operate. There appears to be a great need for empirical studies of ground-
level administrative functions. Such studies would form a base, firmer than the one
now in existence, upon which wise administrative procedure legislation could be
drafted.
FALL 1997]
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of what is needed for such a task. It is neither practical nor sensible
to use limited resources to overproceduralize government action.15
Third, uncertainty about procedural requirements has a dy-
namic effect on agency procedure. A judicial reversal of agency
action that occurs years after the action was taken can be costly and
disruptive to a regulatory program. As a result, an agency uncertain
about what is required is likely to provide every procedure that a
private party demands. Demanding costly and time-consuming pro-
cedural steps thus becomes a powerful tactic in the hands of persons
who are determined to prevent or delay government action and who
can credibly threaten to seek judicial review. Yet agencies should
provide only procedures that truly enhance fairness and are cost ef-
fective and should not be motivated to overproceduralize.
Fourth, judges can easily manipulate broad and vague
administrative law principles to block or delay remedial
government action. Many judges appointed to the bench during the
apartheid era have little sympathy for radical economic and social
change. By requiring a formal hearing or a written statement of
reasons in the plethora of cases in which government and the
individual interact, by expanding the constitutional administrative
justice norms to their outermost frontiers, by employing hard look
review of the reasonableness of agency action, and by deciding
questions of law in ways that fail to give proper deference to
administrative expertise, resourceful courts can stop almost any
social or economic program in its tracks.16 The next section sketches
some of the areas in which the section 33 rights, if allowed to become
free-standing, will be uncertain in application or will require
inefficient expenditure of precious resources.
B. The Right to Procedural Fairness
Section 33(1) provides that everyone has the right to
administrative action that is procedurally fair. At a minimum, the
procedural fairness clause entrenches the preconstitutional rules of
natural justice, including a fair hearing (the "audi principle") and an
impartial decision-maker. 17 The right to an administrative hearing is
15. See Christopher Forsyth, Speaking Truth unto Power: The Reform of Administra-
tive Law, 111 S. AFR. L.J. 408,408-10 (1994).
16. See, e.g., Van Huyssteen v. Minister of Envtl. Affairs & Tourism, 1996 (1) SALR
283 (CPD). This case is discussed later in this Article. See infra text accompanying
notes 17, 24.
17. "This subsection requires decision-makers to act fairly. At the ven least, it con-
stitutionalizes the principles of natural justice which require a person whose rights
are affected by an administrative decision to be heard on his own behalf (audi alteram
partem)." SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY, EXPLANATORY MEMORANDA
[VOL. 3:1
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of paramount importance because it compels a decision-maker to see
and hear the affected individual and confront that person's side of
the dispute. As a result, a hearing may well forestall an incorrect
decision or cause an agency to exercise discretion more favorably to
the individual than it otherwise would have done. Beyond these
utilitarian benefits, a hearing is important because it safeguards an
individual's dignitary interest, treating that person as a human
being rather than as a computer file. Nevertheless, section 33(1)'s
broadly stated right to procedural fairness will present numerous
difficulties.
Under preconstitutional law, natural justice protected persons
whose legal rights or legitimate expectations were affected by ad-
ministrative action.'8 Even taking the minimalist view that section
33(1) does no more than constitutionalize prior law, the right to pro-
cedural fairness is considerably broader than the right to due
process under the U.S. Constitution.19 Yet American due process has
flooded state and federal courts with a torrent of context-specific
litigation that has never abated since the due process revolution
ignited in the 1970s.20 Granted, under present conditions, few of the
citizens of South Africa have the resources to take a dispute over
procedural fairness to court. Nevertheless, the right to procedural
fairness may pose a considerable judicial and administrative burden
as redistributive schemes begin to bite and as citizens learn of their
new constitutional rights and become more accustomed and able to
assert them in court.2 '
ON DRAFT BILL OF RIGHTS, 204 (1995) [hereinafter DRAFT BILL OF RIGHTS] (emphasis
added); see also Van Huyssteen v. Minister of Envtl. Affairs & Tourism, 1996 (1)
SALR 283, 302-06 (CPD) (noting that preconstitutional law gave a right to whatever
procedures were fair in the circumstances and was not limited to the audi principle).
18. See LAWRENCE G. BAXTER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ch. 14 (1984 & Supp. 1990).
19. Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, neither
the state nor federal governments can deprive a person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. For discussion of the ways in which preconstitutional
natural justice might be more protective than American due process, see Asimow,
Interim Constitution, supra note *, at 399-403.
20. The beginning of that revolution is normally traced to the epochal case of
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that the state must provide an eviden-
tiary hearing prior to terminating welfare benefits).
21. Preconstitutional law sometimes provided procedural protection for persons
whose status depended wholly on the discretion of a government official. For
example, if a government employer discharged low-level temporary workers
because of redundancy or misconduct, these workers had the right to a hearing.
Natal v. Sibiya, 1992 (4) SA 532 (A) (redundancy); Transvaal v. Zenzile, 1991 (1) SA
21 (A) (misconduct). Courts reasoned that such dismissals affected legal and
property rights, even when the employment contract provided that the employee
could be dismissed on twenty-four hours notice. Transvaal. 1991 (1) SA at 26.
Moreover, with respect to a dismissal for misconduct, the Court made clear that a
hearing must be provided, even if the only issue is the severity of the penalty. Id. It
FALL 1997]
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Section 33(1)'s right to procedural fairness may well expand
rather than entrench the existing common law of natural justice. 22
The interim Constitution, like the common law, limited the right to
procedural fairness to administrative action that affected or threat-
ened a person's "rights or legitimate expectations." Since this
limiting language does not appear in section 33(1), it seems at least
possible that procedural fairness would apply to cases of adminis-
trative action affecting a person's "interests" rather than merely that
person's "rights or legitimate expectations." 23 Indeed, one decision
applied section 24(b) to require the state to provide a full-fledged
trial-type hearing to explore the environmental impact of rezoning
land for the construction of a steel mill near a protected wetland-a
precedent of truly awe-inspiring proportion.24
Under preconstitutional law, natural justice apparently did not
apply in connection with the withdrawal of "privileges," 25 such as
the termination of benefits or the rejection of applications for
benefactory programs such as pensions or welfare.26 In contrast,
under American due process, the right to a hearing in cases of
statutory entitlement to government benefit programs is solidly
appears that the rule will be the same under the interim Constitution. See Maharaj v.
Chairman, Liquor Bd., 1997 (1) SALR 273 (NPD) (finding that under both section
24(b) and natural justice, the local authority must provide fair procedure before
refusing a discretionary application for a liquor license).
American due process law differs substantially. For example a nonstigmatic
dismissal of a government employee, such as an untenured professor, from a job
held at the employer's discretion entails a deprivation of neither liberty nor property.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
22. See Jonathan Klaaren, Administrative Justice, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF
SOUTH AFRICA § 25.6 (Matthew Chaskalson et al. eds., Supp. 1997).
23. In the interim Constitution, the right to written reasons extended to situations
in which administrative action affected "interests," clearly a much more inclusive
term than "rights" or "legitimate expectations." S. AFR. CONST. of 1994 §24(c); see also
Asimow, Interim Constitution, supra note *, at 412 (arguing that "interests" cover just
about any state action that affects a person and about which the person wants to liti-
gate).
24. Van Huyssteen v. Minister of Envtl. Affairs & Tourism, 1996 (1) SALR 283,
302-08 (CPD). The applicant owned a parcel of land near the proposed steel mill, on
which he hoped to build a holiday residence. Id. at 289.
25. Lower court cases indicate that the right/privilege distinction continues to
exist under the interim Constitution with respect to aliens who were denied the right
to written reasons in connection with deportation decisions. The courts simply
declared that aliens have no rights, legitimate expectations, or even interests that
could be affected or threatened by administrative action. Jonathan Klaaren, So Far
Not So Good: An Analysis of Immigration Decisions under the Interim Constitution, 12 S.
AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 605, 607 (1996).
26. See BAXTER, supra note 18, at ch. 14 (c)(b)(2)(iii) (Supp. 1990); see also Marinus
Wiechers, Administrative Law and the Benefactor State, in CONTROLLING PUBLIC POWER,
supra note 4, at 130, 134.
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entrenched. 27 Certainly, South African law of the future will contain
a variety of benefactory programs; such programs will be seen as
conferring rights or legitimate expectations. Consequently, any
reduction or termination in benefits and probably any denial of
admission to the program will trigger a requirement that the agency
act with procedural fairness under section 33(1).
Moreover, section 33(1) opens the field of mass justice to the
requirement of procedural fairness. All the unpleasant interactions
between local officials and ordinary people relating to public housing,
provision of utility service, prisons, schools, or public hospitals
should trigger rights to procedural fairness.28 Consider prisons, for
example: decisions to transfer a prisoner from a minimum to a
maximum security prison or to subject a prisoner to denial of
privileges because of misconduct might trigger a right to some kind
of appropriate procedure under section 33(1).29 A good case can be
made that such proceduralization would be good for the prison
system which is widely viewed as lawless and capricious. Still,
proceduralization would entail a significant diversion of the
system's resources.
Pending the adoption of administrative justice legislation, the
Constitutional Court should tread cautiously in expanding the right
to procedural fairness. Realistically, it is not possible to grant
hearings or other sorts of compulsory processes in connection with
the vast bulk of low-level discretionary decisions that street-level
bureaucrats make every day.
Defining which government/private interactions trigger the
right to procedural fairness is only the first step in applying section
33(1). The second step is to spell out the content of the right- what
process must be provided and when must it be provided. Obviously,
the question of what qualifies as an appropriate procedure is wholly
contextual. There must be sufficient notice of the proposed
government action and an appropriate opportunity to respond to
the government's contentions. Depending on the context, this may
entail the presentation of witnesses, interpreters, confrontation, and
cross examination. There must be an impartial decision-maker and a
decision based exclusively on the record, but this generalization
27. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Under the Canadian Charter, the Supreme
Court abandoned the right/privilege distinction recognized under the former Canadian Bill
of Rights. Re Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 17 D.L.R.4th
422, 461-62 (Wilson, J., concurring).
28. See Geoff Budlender, The Accessibility of Administrative Justice, in CONTROLLING
PUBL1C POWER, supra note 4, at 144, 149-51.
29. After years of fumbling, the U.S. Supreme Court recently ruled that due
process is inapplicable to most decisions involving prisoners. Sandin v. Conner, 515
U.S. 472 (1995).
FALL 1997]
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conceals numerous complex issues relating to separation of
functions, ex parte contact, biases of various sorts, and what qualifies
as record exclusivity.
Often, the question of timing is critical. Generally, notice and
opportunity to be heard should be provided before the government
acts,30 but the timing issue can be resolved only after a careful bal-
ancing of interests.31 A hearing provided after government has acted
often comes too late to repair the damage caused by that action. In
welfare cases, for example, a mistaken termination of benefits can
leave the beneficiary and her family homeless.32 Yet in many situa-
tions, a right to a prior hearing can be very costly to the particular
regulatory or benefactory program. In welfare programs, for exam-
ple, if government must provide a hearing before it terminates
benefits, unqualified recipients have an incentive to demand a
hearing to keep the checks coming. The result is that many more
hearings will be demanded, often leading to significant backlogs,
and substantial amounts will be paid to unqualified beneficiaries
before the hearing occurs. Therefore, in some circumstances, a bal-
ancing of interests may suggest that government need only provide
rudimentary procedure before it acts and then a full hearing later. In
American due process law, this has become the typical pattern in
connection with termination of government disability benefits33 or
discharge of civil service employees.34
There are countless issues wrapped up in the question of
procedural fairness. It is all very well to say that the right to natural
justice is flexible and that the agency is given substantial deference
in deciding appropriate procedures, but a court must still decide
30. Transvaal v. Traub, 1989 (4) SA 731 (A) (indicating that the hearing must oc-
cur before the decision is taken in order to avoid the natural human inclination to
adhere to a decision and that exceptions can be made when there is a need to act
with expedition but that the decision whether to appoint young doctors to a hospital
staff was not such a situation). In Van Huyssteen v. Minister of Envtl. Affairs & Tour-
ism, 1996 (1) SALR 283, 306-08 (CPD), the Court required that a hearing on the
environmental aspects of building a steel mill precede the decision to rezone the
property since it would be useless to hold a hearing after the project was built or
even substantially begun.
31. See Transvaal Agric. Union v. Minister of Land Affairs, 1996 (12) BCLR 1573
(CC) (stating, in dicta, that the analysis under section 24 of the interim Constitution
should be purely contextual-and thus quite unpredictable).
32. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264 (finding that the brutal need of welfare recipients
requires a full hearing before the termination of benefits).
33. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (cutting back sharply on Goldberg).
Mathews distinguished Goldberg because disability benefits are not based on financial
need, 424 U.S. at 339-343, but this distinction is unpersuasive, since by definition
disabled persons cannot work and are very likely to be indigent.
34. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
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whether the omission of one or more trial-type elements rendered
the particular procedure unfair.35
C. The Right to a Written Statement of Reasons
Section 33(2) guarantees a written statement of reasons when a
person's rights have been adversely affected by administrative
action.36 The value of the written reasons provision is clear. A
decision-maker who is compelled to give reasons must at least
consider the appropriate factors and produce an apparently justified
decision. A statement of reasons helps persons disappointed by the
decision evaluate whether to seek judicial review, and it facilitates
judicial scrutiny of the decision.37 Since there was no right under
preconstitutional law to a written statement of reasons,38 the courts
will have little guidance when they confront disputes under section
33(2). For example, courts must decide which "rights" arising out of
mass justice situations are sufficiently important to merit a written
(as opposed to an oral) reasons statement, whether a request for
reasons must first be made, and how detailed the statement must be.
Would check marks on a form that furnishes a list of possible
reasons suffice?39 Must an agency explain a purely discretionary call
such as the decision to suspend a license for one year rather than
issue a warning to the licensee?
35. The Industrial Court has worked out guidelines for procedural fairness in
connection with dismissal of employees in the private sector. This has required many
years of case-by-case development. By a natural process of accretion, the process
now includes virtually every significant aspect of a formal trial. Edwin Cameron, The
Right to a Hearing Before Dismissal - Part 1, 7 INDUS. L.J. 183, 183 n.3 (1986) (noting that
there were 59 procedural cases in the first seven years of the Court's existence); see
also Edwin Cameron, The Right to a Hearing Before Dismissal - Problems and Puzzles, 9
INDUS. L.J. 147 (1988).
36. S. AFR. CONSr. § 33(2).
37. The provision in section 33(2) is considerably narrower than the parallel
provision in the interim Constitution which guaranteed a written reasons statement
whenever administrative action affected a person's "rights or interests." See Asimow,
Final Constitution, supra note *, at 613-14.
38. See National Transp. Comm'n v. Chetty's Motor Transp., 1972 (3) SA 726, 736-
38 (A) (noting that an agency would be well advised to give reasons but that it is not
required). But see Maharaj v. Chairman, Liquor Bd., 1997 (1) SALR 273, 281-83 (NPD)
(finding that both the interim Constitution and natural justice require a local author-
ity to provide a statement of reasons why an application for a liquor license was
refused).
39. See Klaaren, supra note 25, at 614-15 (observing that courts are very concerned
with the burden of requiring the Department of Home Affairs to state reasons in
every case of an application for residence permits).
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D. Rulemaking v. Adjudication
Preconstitutional South African administrative law imposed no
procedural requirements on agencies engaged in generalized action
such as rulemaking.40 Section 33(1) and (2) may well require procedural
fairness and written statements of reasons in the case of generalized
agency action, because the term "administrative action" is used in
connection with all four rights spelled out in section 33. The words
"administrative action" were intended to describe as wide a range of
administrative behavior as possible.41 Certainly the requirements of
lawfulness and reasonableness in section 33 apply to action of gen-
eralized applicability. Unless the words "administrative action" have
a different meaning with respect to the different rights to adminis-
trative justice, it should follow that the right to procedural fairness
and reason statements apply to generalized as well as particularized
administrative action.4
2
40. This shortcoming has been lamented by numerous writers. Lawrence G.
Baxter, Rule-making and Policy Formulation in South African Administrative Law Reform,
in CONTROLLING PUBLIC POWER, supra note 4, at 92; Etienne Mureinik, Reconsidering
Review: Participation and Accountability, in CONTROLLING PUBLIC POWER, supra note 4,
at 28, 30-31; Catherine O'Regan, Rules for Rule-Making: Administrative Law and
Subordinate Legislation, in CONTROLLING PUBLIC POWER, supra note 4, at 105.
Several preconstitutional cases imposed natural justice requirements in cases
of what could be described as generalized agency action. See South African Rds. Bd.
v. Johannesburg City Council, 1991 (4) SA 1, 16-17 (A) (deciding that charging tolls
on existing road entitles local city council to hearing); Minister of Educ. and Training
v. Ndlovu, 1993 (1) SA 89, 98-99 (A) (deciding that to make entire class retake exam
because a few members had cheated was unconstitutional and that finding that each
member of the class was entitled to a separate hearing). As a result, the distinction
between particularized and generalized agency action was blurred under prior law.
41. LOURENS DU PLESSIS & HUGH CORDER, UNDERSTANDING SOUTH AFRICA'S
TRANSITIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 168 (1994); Klaaren, supra note 22, § 25-2 (1996)
(stating that the term covers all action taken by bodies exercising public power). The
drafters rejected language in prior drafts referring to "acts" or "decisions" in order to
achieve the widest possible coverage. DU PLESSIS & CORDER, supra, at 168; see also
DRAFT BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 17, at 203 (" 'Administrative action' covers all types
of administrative action -legislative, judicial, quasi-judicial and purely administra-
tive."). But see Bernstein v. Bester, 1996 (2) SALR 751, 801 (CC) (stating, in dicta, that
administrative action does not include an investigative inquiry).
42. Preliminary drafts of the final Constitution specifically targeted the issue of
whether the right to procedural fairness covered rulemaking. Because sections 33(1)
and (2) of the final Constitution contain no limitation on the right of procedural fair-
ness for administrative actions of general applicability, it would appear that no such
limitation was intended.
See FIFTH DRAFT OF THE FINAL CONSTITUTION (Apr. 15, 1996) § 34(1)
(bracketing the language "unless it is of general application" as an exception to pro-
cedural fairness); see also SUPPLEMENTARY MEMORANDUM ON BILL OF RIGHTS AND
PARTY SUBMISSIONS § 32 note (Apr. 23, 1996) (calling attention to the problem and




And this is as it should be. Regulations create law that agencies
and courts must follow. A regulation may reduce a civil servant's
compensation, disqualify a welfare beneficiary, or compel a dis-
charger to install pollution control equipment or an employer to
install safety devices. In such cases, the regulation seriously affects
the economic interests of the person affected, even though it has not
yet been applied to that person individually.
If the requirements of procedural fairness and statement of rea-
sons apply to rulemaking, the Constitutional Court must decide
exactly what these provisions demand. The Court might decide that
the Constitution requires something like the traditional notice and
comment rulemaking process under the U.S. Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA).43 Procedural fairness under section 33(1) would
entail notice to the public of what an agency proposes and the
opportunity to furnish written comments on the issues. Section 33(2)
would be satisfied by a discussion of the purpose of the rule and
why alternatives suggested by the public were rejected. All this
must be spelled out by the Constitutional Court as challenges to
regulations arise. Needless to say, a court decision invalidating a
regulation because it was adopted without providing the required
pre-adoption procedure could have a devastating effect on an entire
program of government regulation.
E. Reasonable Administrative Action
The requirement that administrative action be reasonable is of
fundamental importance. It diverges sharply from preconstitutional
law.44 Members of the public should not be subjected to irrational
43. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c) (1994). Since the
enactment of the APA in 1946, hundreds of judicial decisions have transformed its
bare-bones rulemaking provisions into demanding requirements. See 1 KENNETH
CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 287-377 (3d ed.
1994); Michael Asimow, Delegated Legislation: United States and United Kingdom, 3
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 253, 255-57 (1983). My suggestion here is that the rights to
administrative justice in sections 33(1) and (2) would be satisfied by the relatively
simple requirements of the original American APA without the subsequent judicial
embellishment.
44. Maharaj v. Chairman, Liquor Bd., 1997 (1) SALR 273, 277 (NPD) (finding that
prior law accorded a much narrower scope of review than the interim Constitution).
Under prior law, courts could review discretionary administrative action only
on the grounds of vagueness, mala fides, dishonesty, improper purpose, or unreason-
ableness so gross that the court could draw an inference that the decision-maker
failed to apply his or her mind properly or honestly to the case. See Standard Bank of
Bophuthatswana Ltd. v. Reynolds, 1995 (3) SALR 74 (B); Nat'l Transp. Comm'n v.
Chetty's Motor Transp., 1972 (3) SA 726, 735 (A); John Hlophe, Control of Administra-
tive Action in a Post-Apartheid South Africa- Some Realities, in CONTROLLING PUBLIC
POWER, supra note 4, at 60, 61-66. But see BAXTER, supra note 18, at 475-534; Arthur
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agency action in adjudication, rulemaking, or any other type of ad-
ministrative action. The prospect that such actions will be
scrutinized by courts or tribunals for reasonableness disciplines
agency decision-makers and strengthens the hands of those staff
members who insist on reasoned decision-making.
45
Nevertheless, there are compelling arguments in favor of a cau-
tious approach to reasonableness review. An obligation to assess the
reasonableness of agency action can impose a significant burden on
busy courts. In order to decide whether a scheme of environmental
regulation meets rationality standards, for example, the judges must
master detailed and often highly technical records.46 Limited judicial
resources of time and talent militate against this sort of review. Most
significant, judges can utilize the power to declare agency action un-
reasonable as a device to substitute their own policy preferences in
place of the agency's. This is a particular risk if courts engage in the
sort of "hard look" review of agency methodology and reasoning
that sometimes surfaces in American judicial review practice.
47
Review for reasonableness should entail the following steps.
First, a court should insure that the action under review is factually
supported. After examining the evidence that both supports and
opposes the agency decision, a court must conclude that a
reasonable person could have arrived at the agency's conclusion.
This would constitutionalize something like the American test of
Chaskalson, Legal Control of the Administrative Process, 102 S. AFR. L.J. 419, 427-28
(1985) (observing that courts sometimes assessed the reasonableness of administra-
tive acts).
45. See William Funk, Rationality Review of State Administrative Rulemaking, 43
ADMIN. L. REv. 147, 170-72 (1991); William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Infor-
mal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38,60 (1975).
46. See, for example, Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981), a case
which required the court to review the reasonableness of air pollution standards for
coal-fired power plants. Judge Wald wrote:
We have read the record with as hard a look as mortal judges can
probably give its thousands of pages. We have adopted a simple and
straight-forward standard of review, probed the agency's rationale,
studied its references (and those of appellants), endeavored to under-
stand them where they were intelligible (parts were simply
impenetrable), and on close questions given the agency the benefit of
the doubt out of deference for the terrible complexity of its job. We are
not engineers, computer modelers, economists or statisticians, although
many of the documents in this record require such expertise - and
more.
Id. at 410 (footnote omitted).
47. The prototypical hard look case is Motor Vehicle Mfg. Ass 'n v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of
Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 363, 391-94 (1986); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some




substantial evidence on the whole record.4 ' A faithful application of
the substantial evidence test does not allow a court to reweigh the
evidence and overturn the decision merely because it prefers a
conclusion different from the agency's.
In addition to finding factual support, the court must be
satisfied that the agency took account of all relevant factors and no
irrelevant factors. The court must conclude that the agency acted out
of proper motives and considered and addressed objections to its
decision. Discretionary decisions must meet the test of proportionality,
meaning that the agency must explain why a less onerous
alternative would not have served its purpose. Finally, and most
fundamental, the court must review the actual balance of factors
struck by the agency to insure that the decision is within the bounds
of logical reasoning and common sense. It is apparent that
reasonableness review of administrative action can be a significant
consumer of legal resources and contains large potential for the
substitution of judicial for administrative judgment.
F. Public vs. Private Administrative Action
Some preconstitutional cases imposed administrative law
norms on bodies outside the government, at least as American
readers would apply the state action requirement.49 Influential
commentary5 and the reports of a committee engaged in drafting
the final Constitution"] all suggest that powerful private sector
entities should be bound by the section 33 norms. It will not be easy
for the Constitutional Court to decide which institutions fall on
which side of the line. Nor is it obvious what procedures are
appropriate for private sector decision-makers, particularly as new
48. The leading U.S. decision reflecting this test is Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474 (1951). See Reynolds, 1995 (3) SALR at 96 (indicating that section 24(d) of
the interim Constitution embodies the substantial evidence test).
49. See Alfred Cockrell, Can You Paradigm-Another Perspective on the Public
Law/Private Law Divide, in CONTROLLING PUBLIC POWER, supra note 4, at 118.
50. See The Breakwater Declaration, Administrative Law for a Future South Africa, in
CONTROLLING PUBLIC POWER, supra note 4, at 233, 234 § I(iii) ("Public power includes
not only the power exercised by governmental institutions at all levels and of different
kinds. It includes also the exercise of power in some circumstances by nominally pri-
vate bodies. In a democracy, the exercise of public power should be accountable and
be required to conform to the principles of fairness, equality and responsiveness."); see
also Marinus Wiechers, Administrative Law and the Benefactor State, in CONTROLLING
PUBLIC POWER, supra note 4, at 130, 133-36.
51. DRAFT BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 17, at 203, 205 ("Section 24 is principally en-
forceable against the State; thus it clearly has vertical operation. It may, however, also
be raised against private institutions, such as churches, universities and trade un-
ions.").
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nongovernmental institutions emerge to provide services or engage
in regulation.
G. The Right to Lawful Administrative Action
The ability of reviewing courts or tribunals to decide questions
of legality is fundamental to administrative law. Such review
provides assurance that agency action will fall within the scope of
the discretion delegated by the legislature and otherwise be faithful
to the rule of law. Such review is essential, therefore, to a system of
accountable government. Section 33(1) provides a right to "lawful
administrative action" and thus assures scrutiny of agency legal
interpretations by courts or tribunals.
Preconstitutional South African law displayed ambivalence
about the reviewability of agency legal interpretations. Under one
formulation, an agency's legal interpretation is reviewable unless
the legislature intended to commit the interpretive question to the
agency's discretion.2 I question whether this distinction can be
maintained under section 33(1). Since the right to lawful action in
section 33(1) was intended, at a minimum, to ban ouster clauses,s3 it
would appear that Parliament cannot commit a question of legal in-
terpretation to an agency's discretion. All interpretive issues must be
reviewable, whether or not jurisdictional, and whether they involve
interpretation of a statute, a regulation, or other legal text.
In America, a high percentage of administrative law cases
require the court to review an agency's interpretation of statutes or
regulations. These cases are often challenging, since many
regulatory schemes involve complex statutes and regulations little
52. Hira v. Booysen, 1992 (4) SA 69, 93 (A). Hira indicated that a delegation of un-
reviewable interpretive power is likely in cases involving broad agency discretion but
less likely in cases where the question is whether a person's conduct falls within a de-
fined standard. Id. The reasoning of Hira was apparently influenced by Etienne
Mureinik, The Application of Rules: Law or Fact, 98 LAW Q. REV. 587 (1982)
(recommending that the test should be whether the legislature intended to commit in-
terpretive discretion to agency).
53. DRAFr BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 17, at 204; DU PLESSIS & CORDER, supra note
41, at 163-68; Klaaren, supra note 22, § 25-9.
54. In order to successfully implement the judicial review norm, courts must
resolve the difficult issue of the scope of review of applications of law to fact. For
various perspectives, see Michael Asimow, The Scope of Judicial Review of Decisions of
California Administrative Agencies, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1157, 1209-24 (1995) (stating that
such applications are questions of law with appropriate deference to the agency's
view); Ronald M. Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 CEO. L.J.
1, 41 (1985) (recommending that application questions should be considered issues of




understood by judges. Section 33(1) is likely to impose similar
burdens on South African reviewing courts and tribunals.
Section 33(1) is clearly intended to introduce a rule-of-law norm
in connection with review of agency statutory interpretations. As a
result, South African courts and tribunals should not follow the
Chevron rule,5 which is sporadically applied by American federal
courts. Chevron commits the interpretation of ambiguous statutory
language to agency discretion. Instead, South African reviewing
authorities should consider adapting the pre-Chevron model, which
is employed in most states, of giving deference only to carefully
reasoned interpretations of ambiguous statutory language and only where
the agency's expertise gives it a genuine interpretive advantage over the
court or tribunal."'
III. THE NEED FOR AN ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE ACT
The Constitutional Court confronts an enormous challenge. On
the shoulders of this Court rests the long-term viability of the
Constitution and of successful multiparty democracy. To an outside
observer, the Court's responsibilities are breathtaking. The drafters
of the Constitution deliberately created a Bill of Rights that they
knew would require substantial limitation before it could work in
practice. Some of the rights are extraordinarily open-ended, such as
the rights to protection of dignity, privacy, equality, property, and to
an environment that is not harmful to health or well-being.57 The
Court will also find it difficult to give content to the provisions for
positive rights to housing, health care, access to land, nutrition,
social security, and education.- While the Constitution represents a
consensus that the courts should vindicate some broadly stated
rights, there is little consensus on what these rights actually mean in
practice, how to resolve conflicts between rights, and what
limitations on rights are appropriate. And, of course, in addition to
applying and limiting the Bill of Rights, the Constitutional Court has
numerous other formidable chores, such as resolving disputes over
federalism and other political controversies. Prior to 1994, South
55. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
56. See Asimow, supra note 54, at 1193-98, 1203-08; see also DAVIS & PIERCE, supra
note 43, at 233-48; David R. Woodward & Ronald M. Levin, In Defense of Deference:
Judicial Review of Agency Action, 31 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 332-36 (1979) (summarizing
pre-Chevron judicial practice).
57. S. AFR. CONST. §§ 9-10, 14, 24-25.
58. S. AFR. CONST. §§ 25(5), 26, 27(1)(a)-(c), 29; see also David P. Currie, Positive and
Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864, 889 (1986) (asserting that these
"rights... have such imprecise boundaries that their effectuation is not to be expected
without legislative and executive definition").
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African courts were totally unaccustomed to the sort of wide-open
judicial policymaking that bill of rights adjudication entails. The
pillar of preconstitutional law was parliamentary supremacy. The
judiciary had little leverage available to check parliamentary or
executive action, however unjust it seemed.s9 Today the compass has
moved 180 degrees. The eleven judges of the Constitutional Court
are the philosopher kings of South Africa. In defining the meaning
of the Bill of Rights and limiting their application, the Court will be
called upon to settle a vast number of critical and hotly controversial
questions of public policy.60
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 imposes
similar responsibilities on the Canadian Supreme Court. It has been
deluged with difficult cases,6' yet the Canadian Charter contains
many fewer rights and freedoms than does the South African
Constitution.62 The U.S. Supreme Court has taken 200 years6 to
define and apply the provisions of the American Bill of Rights,
which also contain far fewer guarantees than does the South African
Constitution, and it certainly has not completed the job. The
Constitutional Court is expected to do it all immediately.
The history of the U.S. Supreme Court, as well as of
supreme judicial bodies in other nations," suggests that the
59. The paradigms suggested by Nonet and Selznick describe this immense shift.
Preconstitutional law conformed to the model of "repressive law," meaning that its
purpose was the defense of the social status quo. The government had vast discretion-
ary power and was not subject to much legal restriction. Under the Constitution, South
Africa conforms to the model of "autonomous law," meaning that it is more oriented
to procedural fairness, official discretion is more confined, and the government is ex-
tensively bound by law. PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN
TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW 104-05 (1978).
60. See Jeremy Sarkin, The Political Role of the South African Constitutional Court, 114
S. AFR. L.J. 134, 148-50 (1997).
61. See Jeremy Webber, Tales of the Unexpected: Intended and Unintended Conse-
quences of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 5 CANTERBURY L. REV. 207, 212,
229-30 (1993) (observing that the court has to decide at least 25 constitutional cases
per year, most of which involve wide-open judicial policymaking and value judg-
ment).
62. For example, the Charter does not provide for due process in connection with
deprivations of economic rights. Attorney Gen. of Quebec v. Irwin Toy Co. [19891 58
D.L.R.4th 577. Moreover, the Canadian charter allows for an override of constitutional
rights by specific legislation. CAN. CONST. (Canada Act 1982) Sched. B (Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms) pt. I, § 33.
63. More precisely, it has been working for 200 years on the first ten amendments
to the Constitution and 125 years on the problems of due process and equal protection
embodied in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth amendments.
64. In India, the Supreme Court obstructed land reform, setting off a cycle of
constitutional amendments that were in turn invalidated by the Court. See David
Gwynn Morgan, The Indian "Essential Features" Case, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 307
(1981). In postrevolutionary Iran, the Council of Guardians invalidated radical land
reform legislation on constitutional grounds, leading ultimately to the demise of the
[VOL. 3:1
FALL 19971 Administrative Justice Act
legitimacy 6' of the Constitutional Court will soon be called into
question. In the 1930s, a conservative Supreme Court invalidated,
on due process and federalism grounds, a long line of federal and
state statutes intended to grapple with the Depression and toS67
enhance workers' economic security. This led to President
Roosevelt's attempt to pack the Court. Similarly, when the Supreme
Court or lower courts have ventured into the great questions of the
day, such as school desegregation, abortion, the death penalty,
affirmative action, immigrant rights, or school prayer, the public
response has been strong, sustained, and vitriolic. In California,
state supreme court justices perceived to be thwarting the death
penalty were voted out of office.69 A U.S. Supreme Court decision
denying citizenship to a slave and spreading slavery to free states
helped provoke the Civil War.70
The American experience shows that there is a limit on the
extent to which a court can engage in policymaking that obstructs
the popular will before it is viewed as just another political player-
and a nonaccountable one at that. Already, the Constitutional Court
has rendered a series of controversial decisions under the interim
Council. CHIBLI MALLAT, THE RENEWAL OF ISLAMIC LAW 79-111, 146-55 (1993). In
Chile, decisions by the Supreme Court that invalidated land reform led to a refusal by
the executive branch to enforce the Court's decrees. See Neal P. Panish, Comment,
Chile Under Allende: The Decline of the Judiciary and the Rise of a State of Necessity, 9 LOY.
L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 693 (1987).
65. By "legitimacy," I mean the court's ability to command obedience to its deci-
sions without the use of force. See ARCHIBALD COX, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT
IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 103-05 (1976); see also MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS 130-32 (1947) (observing that the willingness
to submit to the order of a group implies a belief in the legitimacy of the authority of
the source imposing it); Stephen Ellmann, Law and Legitimacy in South Africa, 20 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 407, 411-12 (1995) (defining legitimacy as effective belief in the binding
quality of the social order).
66. The definitive treatment of this issue is JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 129-70 (1980) (examining the danger and necessity
of judicial review). For a discussion of the ways in which the Constitutional Court can
enhance its legitimacy, see Jonathan Zasloff, The Tyranny of Madison, 44 UCLA L. REV.
795, 850-55 (1997) (urging judges to adopt literalism, bright line rules, stare decisis,
and proceduralism).
67. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 307-10, 567-86 (2d
ed. 1988).
68. Controversial Supreme Court decisions prompted calls in Congress for limita-
tion of the Court's jurisdiction. The bills were not enacted, so the Court never had to
confront the difficult constitutional question of whether Congress could, in effect,
amend the Constitution by limiting the Court's jurisdiction. See id. at 44-50.
69. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Supreme Court Retention Elections in California, 28 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 333 (1988); Colloquy, Transcript-California Judicial Retention Elections,
28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 357 (1988).
70. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); see also JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.6, at 608-610 (4th ed. 1991).
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and final constitutions, and it has scarcely begun the process of
applying the Bill of Rights to the endless assortment of
preconstitutional statutes, regulations, and common law rules.7
Very quickly, the Constitutional Court will test the limits of its
legitimacy. At that point, its unpopular decisions may be amended
out of existence,3 and many of the underlying rights may disappear
along with them.74 Parliament should come to the rescue of the
Constitutional Court by resolving as many of the open questions as
possible. This includes the conceptual puzzles posed by the
administrative justice provisions of the Constitution. The
Constitutional Court's legitimacy is a precious coin that must not be
squandered.
Policymakers must also be concerned by the Court's meager
resources of time and energy. The number of issues upon which the
Court will be called to address may swiftly outstrip its ability to
decide cases.7 Thus the Court may encounter an ever-lengthening
backlog or be compelled to use its discretionary powers to decline
review of cases that urgently require review. The administrative law
provisions of the Bill of Rights threaten to deluge the courts,
including the Constitutional Court, with context-specific issues
relating to the lawfulness and reasonableness of administrative
71. See the articles and case comments on the first year of Constitutional Court ju-
risprudence in 12 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 1-192 (1996).
72. See Heinz Klug, Introducing the Devil: An Institutional Analysis of the Power of
Constitutional Review, 13 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 185 (1997). Klug gives an insightful
analysis of the Constitutional Court's strategy in insuring its legitimacy.
73. S. AFR. CONST. § 74 (providing that in most situations, the Constitution can be
amended by a two-thirds vote of the National Assembly and six provinces in the Na-
tional Council of Provinces). But see Premier, KwaZulu-Natal v. President of the
Republic of S. Afr., 1996 (1) SALR 769, 783-84 (CC) (suggesting that an amendment
that radically and fundamentally restructured and reorganized the fundamental
premises of the Constitution might not qualify as an "amendment").
74. This has frequently occurred in California, where the state constitution can be
easily amended by voter initiative. See, e.g., J. Clark Kelso & Brigitte A. Bass, The
Victims' Bill of Rights: Where Did It Come from and How Much Did It Do?, 23 PAC. L.J.
843, 855-65 (1992) (discussing an initiative that wiped out numerous criminal
procedure decisions by the California Supreme Court). The Zimbabwean legislature
has repeatedly amended its Constitution to thwart its Supreme Court's decisions.
Anthony R. Gubbay, The Protection and Enforcement of Fundamental Human Rights: The
Zimbabwean Experience, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 227, 243, 251-53 (1997); see also John
Hatchard, Undermining the Constitution by Constitutional Means: Some Thoughts on the
New Constitutions of Southern Africa, 28 COMP. & INT'L J. S. AFR. 21, 21-25 (1995).
75. As an outside observer, I am impressed by the length and erudition of
Constitutional Court opinions. Each opinion cites, quotes at length, and analyzes a
wide variety of foreign and international authorities. Each one meticulously discusses
the prior South African practice and case law. Frequently there are several opinions.
Unfortunately, reflecting the leisurely habits of the South African judiciary of the past,




action as well as questions relating to procedural fairness and
written reasons.
This onslaught of cases, and the risk that an improvident
decision might completely disrupt the functioning of government,
may lead the courts into unprincipled decisions narrowing the scope
of the constitutional right to administrative justice. Although the
Constitutional Court has yet to confront any of the major issues
posed by the administrative justice provisions of the interim or final
constitutions, some lower court decisions are troubling. For
example, the Supreme Court has ruled that aliens have no right,
legitimate expectation, or even a legally protected interest in
receiving a temporary residence permit; consequently they are not
entitled to fair procedure or a statement of reasons under sections
24(b) and (c) of the interim Constitution.76 The subtext of these
decisions may well have been judicial concern that a reasons
requirement would have swamped both the Department of Home
Affairs and the courts.7
In order to protect the Court's legitimacy and conserve its
resources, to safeguard the constitutional provisions from unprincipled
narrowing by the judiciary, and to guard against decisions mandating
improvident expenditures of public resources, Parliament should not
allow the provisions of section 33 to become free-standing. Instead,
it should resolve through legislation as many of the questions
arising under the administrative justice provision as it possibly can.79
IV. A SOUTH AFRICAN ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE ACT
A. The Process of Drafting an Administrative Justice Act
The difficulties encountered in drafting a South African
Administrative Justice Act (AJA) are daunting. The statute is certain
to be controversial, lengthy, and detailed, striking countless
compromises between fairness and efficiency. Failing enactment of a
new AJA, Parliament should consider the administrative law aspects
of each piece of legislation it enacts, providing for the procedural
modalities that will be used to implement the Act and for the details
of review of agency decisions by courts or tribunals.
76. See, e.g., Xu v. Minister van Binnelandske Sake, 1995 (1) SALR 185 (T).
77. Klaaren, supra note 25, at 614-16.
78. See Van Huyssteen v. Minister of Envtl. Affairs & Tourism, 1996 (1) SALR 283,
302-08 (CPD).
79. See Lene Johannessen et al., A Motivation for Legislation on Access to Information,
112 S. AFR. L.J. 45 (1995) (urging enactment of legislation to implement the Constitu-
tion's freedom of information provision).
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There are plenty of models from which the drafters of a new
AJA can draw inspiration. American courts have long experience
interpreting and applying the federal APA. All fifty states have
APAs of their own, some of them recently adopted.0 The 1981
Model State APA is a rich source of guidance.81 There are numerous
models available from other nations. '
B. Taking Administrative Efficiency into Account
The Constitution provides that Parliament must "promote an
efficient administration" when it implements the rights to
administrative justice.3 This explicit recognition of efficiency is of
paramount importance, since it is unclear whether Parliament or the
courts are permitted to take account of efficiency in applying the
general limitations provision of section 36 to the administrative
justice provisions. 4 As this Article has argued, if the rights to
administrative justice are pushed too far, the costs in terms of
resources and obstruction of government programs will outweigh
the benefits." Therefore, limitations based on administrative
efficiency are appropriate and essential.
80. The California, Florida, Wisconsin, Utah, and Washington statutes will be of
particular assistance. For discussion of the issues that must be addressed in drafting
the adjudication and judicial review provisions of a new APA, see Michael Asimow,
Toward a New California Administrative Procedure Act: Adjudication Fundamentals, 39
UCLA L. REv. 1067 (1992); see also Asimow, supra note 54.
81. MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT (1990 & Supp. 1997).
82. See, e.g., MARGARET ALLARS, INTRODUCTION TO AUSTRALIAN ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW (1990); WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 904-63
(7th ed. 1994) (reviewing the British tribunal system under the Tribunals & Inquiries
Acts of 1958, 1971, and 1992); Corder, supra note 2, at 35-41; O'Regan, supra note 40,
at 105, 111, nn.37-38; Wilhelm Rapp, Report on Administrative Law and Judicial Review
of Administrative Decisions in Germany, in CONTROLLING PUBLIC POWER, supra note 4,
at 216; Cheryl Saunders, Appeal or Review: Administrative Appeals in Australia, in
CONTROLLING PUBLIC POWER, supra note 4, at 196.
83. S. AFR. CONST. § 33(3)(c).
84. In Asimow, Final Constitution, supra note *, at 627-28, I argued that the courts
and Parliament could consider administrative efficiency in applying the general limi-
tations provision in the interim Constitution. To the extent Parliament fails to enact an
AJA within the time constraints set by section 33(3), the chore of limiting the adminis-
trative justice rights falls to Parliament or the Constitutional Court under section 36 of
the final Constitution. I continue to believe that both the courts and the legislature can,
and should, consider efficient administration under the general limitations clause. See
the discussion of the need to take efficiency into account in SUPPLEMENTARY
MEMORANDUM OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND PARTY SUBMISSIONS, supra note 42, § 32.
85. On this point, Parliament and the courts should be influenced favorably by
American decisions that limit the scope of the due process clause by considerations of
cost and efficiency. See Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305,
319-34 (1985); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 320-22 (1976). These decisions
balance the nature of the right in question, the utility of the procedure in issue, and the
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Many South Africans, exhilarated by their new Bill of Rights
and reacting against the oppression of the past, are reluctant to
countenance limitation of these rights for reasons of cost, efficiency,
or expediency. Their reaction to the explicit recognition of efficiency
in section 33(3)(c) is one of dismay. Yet this Article has attempted to
show that such limitations are necessary, lest government agencies
administering vital functions find themselves spending their limited
resources or incurring excessive delays in order to satisfy procedural
requirements of dubious utility. South Africa cannot afford all the
procedure that the broadest interpretations of section 33(1) and (2)
would require. Neither under- nor overproceduralization is
"justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dig-
nity, equality, and freedom.""
C. Elements of a New Administrative Justice Act
This Article is obviously not the place to set forth a detailed
scheme for a South African AJA, but I would like to suggest some of
the elements that might be contained in such a law.87
1. Administrative Adjudication. The statute might create several
different adjudicatory models. These models would provide the
elements of procedural fairness and reasons statements when the
statute creating the administrative scheme in question fails to spell
out the appropriate procedures.u The models involve descending
levels of formality and cost, depending on the importance of the
government's interest in refusing to provide the procedure. Mathews, for example,
upheld a statute providing that hearings relating to the termination of disability
benefits can occur after, rather than before, the benefits are cut off. Mathews, 424 U.S.
at 322. The Court was heavily influenced by the administrative burdens and costs of
requiring prior hearings. Id.
86. S. AFR. CONST. § 36(1).
87. These suggestions arise out of my experience as consultant to the California
Law Revision Commission which has worked since 1989 to propose a new APA in
California. See Asimow, supra note 80; Michael Asimow, The Influence of the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act on California's New Administrative Procedure Act, 32 TULSA
L.J. 297 (1996). The Commission will propose legislation relating to judicial review
and rulemaking. The administrative adjudication provisions recommended by the
Commission have already been enacted. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11400-11470.10 (West
Supp. 1997). This Article reflects my views, not those of the Commission, its staff, or
members.
88. Alternatively, a statute that creates a particular regulatory or benefactory
scheme could conveniently refer to one of the APA models to describe the procedure.
The statute might then rework that model for the specific function in question.
The statute should provide for alternative dispute resolution (negotiation, me-
diation, and arbitration) to the fullest extent possible. It should also provide for the use
of the telephone and other electronic media in the interests of efficiency.
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issues at stake and the type of issues that must be resolved.' This is
the approach taken by the 1981 Model State APA.9'
One model would prescribe full-scale formal adjudication.9'
This model would be employed when important rights are at stake
and the agency must resolve questions of adjudicatory fact that turn
on credibility. For example, formal adjudication is appropriate when
the state seeks to revoke a professional license, expel a student from
school, or impose a substantial civil penalty. Most of the procedures
employed in court should apply in formal adjudication. Among
other things, parties should have a right to retained counsel, pres-
entation of evidence through testimony, and cross-examination of
adverse witnesses.9
A second model might be called informal or conference
procedure.3 When informal procedure applies, an agency would be
required to provide proper notice and an impartial decision-maker,
to decide the case exclusively on the record, and to provide a written
reasons statement. However, the agency could dispense partially or
completely with testimony by witnesses and cross-examination.
Instead, the litigants would be entitled to submit written statements
and to make oral arguments.
Informal procedure would be appropriate for matters where
less important rights are at stake, such as small monetary sanctions
or a brief disciplinary suspension from work or school. It is espe-
cially useful where the agency need not resolve questions of
credibility. For example, cases involving economic issues such as
rate-making, permitting, license applications, land planning, and
zoning are appropriate subjects for informal procedure; they often
involve issues of discretion and judgment but not credibility. Most
89. In a recent South African death penalty case, State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3)
SALR 391 (CC), Presiding Judge Chaskalson pointed out that not all constitutional
rights are equal and that each has different implications for democracy. Id. at 436. As
a result, there is no absolute standard for determining whether a limitation is permis-
sible. Different levels of formality are appropriate, depending on the particular claim
to administrative justice. See id.
90. MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT, §§ 4-101 to 4-506 (1990 & Supp. 1997).
91. See, e.g., id., §§ 4-201 to 4-221.
92. Some cases that call for formal adjudication also require the government to act
quickly and decisively. It may be appropriate in such situations to provide a relatively
brief probable-cause type proceeding before the government acts, and to follow up
with a full-fledged hearing later. This pattern may be appropriate in cases involving
termination of government benefits, suspension of professional licensees from
practice, or removal of tenured government employees for misconduct. See supra text
accompanying note 21.
93. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11445.10 to 11445.60 (West Supp. 1997); MODEL




factual issues arising in this sort of case can best be resolved through
written submissions by experts followed by oral argument."
Finally, there are cases to which section 33 might apply which
involve relatively trivial stakes or which are characterized by an
extraordinary need for speedy and routine disposition. Here, even
informal procedure may be too costly. The statute might call for a
third model, called summary procedure,9" in which a party is
provided an opportunity to tell his or her side of the story to a
decision-maker. The decision-maker need not be impartial or
uninvolved in the dispute and need not decide the case on an
exclusive record. The party would be entitled to receive an oral
explanation of the decision and to seek reconsideration of the
decision at a higher bureaucratic level. Summary procedure
provides relatively little procedural protection, but it is better than
nothing and may be all that society can afford to provide in a wide
range of situations.
2. Rulemaking. The AJA should spell out a bare-bones procedure
for public participation in the adoption of delegated legislation.96
These provisions might include public notice of a proposed rule, an
opportunity to make written conments,97 a statement of reasons for
the agency's decision which explains why less burdensome alterna-
tives were rejected, and publication of the rule before it goes into
effect. The statute should provide that comments can be received
after the rule goes into effect in emergency situations and it should
make clear that guidance documents (such as circulars, interpreta-
tions, bulletins, rulings and the like) can be adopted without public
participation. It might also provide a negotiated rulemaking option.
3. Judicial review. The statute should clarify the fundamental
questions relating to review, whether such review is performed by
courts or by generalized or specialized tribunals outside the judicial
system. It should define in some detail the reviewing body's scope
of review with respect to questions of fact, law, application of law to
fact, procedure, and discretion. In particular, the terms "lawful" and
"reasonable" in section 33(1) should be defined. The statute should
94. For this reason, I question the decision in Van Huyssteen v. Minister of Envtl. Af-
fairs & Tourism, 1996 (1) SALR 283 (CPD), discussed supra text accompanying note 24.
95. See, e.g., MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT §§ 4-502 to 4-506, Asimow, su-
pra note 80, at 1100-02.
96. Thus, the procedure would resemble the one provided in the federal APA
before it became encumbered with a variety of legislative, judicial, and executive
refinements. See supra text accompanying notes 40-45; see also Ross Kriel, Codifying
Pre-Adoption Procedures for Subordinate legislation in South Africa, 13 S. AFR. J. ON HUM.
RTS. 354 (1997) (making carefully considered suggestions about the rulemaking
provisions in an Administrative Justice Act).
97. The statute should encourage extensive use of the internet for giving notice,
submitting comments, and publishing final rules.
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preclude the reviewing body from substituting judicial for adminis-
trative judgment on issues involving fact, discretion or policy.
In addition, the statute should clarify other fundamental review
issues. It should define who has standing to seek review and clarify
timing questions such as ripeness and exhaustion of remedies. It
should explain when a court or tribunal can grant a stay of admin-
istrative action pending review. It should define the record for
review and explain whether that record is open or closed and
whether the agency can supply post hoc reasons for its actions.
CONCLUSION
The Bill of Rights in South Africa's Constitution embodies a
true legal revolution. It is one of the most inspiring jurisprudential
developments of the twentieth century. Yet none of us can know
whether this constitutional experiment will take root and flourish in
the decades to come or will wither because of crippling amendments
and delegitimation of the courts. Everything depends on the ability
of the Constitutional Court to implement and to limit the provisions
of the Bill of Rights. Its success is by no means assured.
In its decision certifying the final Constitution, the Constitu-
tional Court made some trenchant observations about the freedom
of information provision of the Constitution:
The transitional measure [which is the same as the transi-
tional measure concerning administrative justice] is
obviously a means of affording Parliament time to provide
the necessary legislative framework for the implementation
of the right to information. Freedom of information legis-
lation usually involves detailed and complex provisions
defining the nature and limits of the right and the requisite
conditions for its enforcement.... The Legislature is far
better placed than the Courts to lay down the practical
requirements for the enforcement of the right and the defi-
nition of its limits. Although § 32(1) [the freedom of
information provision which provides a broad right of ac-
cess to any information held by the State] is capable of
being enforced by a court-and, if the necessary legislation
is not put in place within the prescribed time it will have to
be-legislative regulation is obviously preferable.9
This observation, and its subtextual plea for help, applies with
even greater force to the open-ended administrative justice provi-
98. Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (4) SALR
744, 802-03 (CC).
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sions of the Constitution. It is essential that, whenever possible, the
Bill of Rights be appropriately defined and limited by statutes
enacted by the electorally accountable Parliament rather than by de-
cisions of a non-accountable Court.
Although the demands on the time and attention of Parliament
and of South African academics are enormous, priority must be ac-
corded to drafting and enacting an Administrative Justice Act
within the three-year time frame established by the Constitution.
